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Abstract
Rothblum showed in [7] that the convex hull of the stable matchings of a
bipartite preference system can be described by an elegant system of linear
inequalities. In this note we show that the description given by Rothblum is
totaly dual integral. Our proof is based on the results of Gusfield and Irving on
rotations.
1 Introduction
The stable marriage problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley [4], who showed
that every bipartite preference system has a stable matching, and gave an algorithm
that finds one. Since then, a lot of progress has been made in understanding the
problem and its non-bipartite version, the so-called stable roommates problem. Of
particular interest are the results of Vande Vate [8] and Rothblum [7], who gave simple
systems of linear inequalities that describe the convex hull of stable matchings of a
bipartite preference system.
The contribution of the present paper is that the linear system of Rothblum is in
fact a totally dual integral system, and integral dual optimal solutions can be derived
from the dual solutions of the associated rotation system.
Let G = (U, V ;E) be a bipartite graph, and for every w ∈ U ∪V let <w be a linear
order of the edges incident to w. The set of these linear orders is denoted by O, and
the pair (G,O) is called a bipartite preference system. The notation e 6w f is used
if e <w f or e = f (we say that e dominates f). An edge e is said to be better at w
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than f if e <v f . We use e <U f to denote that e and f has a common endnode in U
and there e is better than f .
Let E ′ ⊆ E be a set of edges. An edge e ∈ E blocks E ′ if e is not dominated by
any element of E ′. A matching M is called stable if it is not blocked by any edge of
E, i.e.M dominates every edge. In particular, every stable matching is inclusion-wise
maximal. For a node w covered by M , let pM(w) denote the other endnode of the
edge of M covering w.
The rest of this section contains some well-known results on stable matchings that
are used in the subsequent proofs. Gale and Shapley proved that every bipartite
preference system has a stable matching, and they gave an algorithm for finding one.
The structural properties of stable matchings were first described in [6]. It is easy
to see that any two stable matchings M,N cover the same node set. For u ∈ U , let
minu(M,N) be the best edge ofM ∪N at u, and let maxu(M,N) be the worst edge of
M ∪N at u (if u is not covered byM ∪N , then minu(M,N) = maxu(M,N) = ∅). Let
M ∧N := {minu(M,N) | u ∈ U} and M ∨N := {maxu(M,N) | u ∈ U}. It is easy to
see that M ∧N and M ∨N are stable matchings. Conway proved that the set M of
stable matchings with the operations ∧ and ∨ forms a distributive lattice, which has a
unique minimal element (the U -optimal stable matching MU) and a unique maximal
element (the V -optimal stable matching MV ). The algorithm of Gale and Shapley
finds MU or MV .
2 Rotations
In this section we describe the basic properties of so-called rotations, and show how
a minimum cost stable matching can be found using the structure of the rotations of
the bipartite preference system. These results are taken from the book of Gusfield
and Irving [5].
Let (G,O) be a bipartite preference system, M a stable matching, and u ∈ U a
node covered by M . Let sM(u) denote the node v ∈ V (if it exists) for which the
following hold:
• (u, v) ∈ E and (u, v) is better at v than (u, pM(u)),
• if (u, v′) ∈ E and (u, v′) <u (u, v), then v′ is covered by M , and (u, v′) is not
better at v′ than (pM(v′), v′).
It is easy to see that if an edge (u, v) is between (u, sM(u)) and (u, pM(u)) according
to the linear order at u, then (u, v) is not in a stable matching.
A cycle ρ = (v1, u1, v2, u2, . . . vk, uk) is called a rotation if there is a stable matching
M such that (ui, vi) ∈M and vi+1 = sM(ui) for every i = 1, 2, . . . k (where vk+1 = v1).
If these properties hold for a rotation ρ and a stable matching M , then we say that ρ
can be eliminated from M . Let M/ρ :=M \ {(vi, ui) : i = 1, 2, ...k} ∪ {(ui, vi+1) : i =
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V sM (u) ∀v′
uU
Figure 1: Definition of sM(u)
1, 2, ...k}, this is obtained by eliminating ρ from M . We say that the edges of type
(vi, ui) are discarded edges in ρ, and the edges of type (ui, vi+1) are promoted edges
in ρ. Thus at ui the discarded edge is better than the promoted edge, and at vi the
promoted edge is better than the discarded edge.
Claim 2.1 ([5]). M/ρ is a stable matching, and M/ρ covers M in the lattice M.
It turns out that rotations have a very rich structure which completely describes the
structure of stable matchings. Let R be the set of rotations of the bipartite preference
system. The following are true:
• Let M and N be stable matchings such that M ∧ N = M in the lattice of
stable matchings. Then N can be obtained from M by successively eliminating
a sequence of rotations. The set of rotations that have to be eliminated is unique
(but the sequence is not). In particular, every stable matching can be obtained
by eliminating a sequence of rotations from MU . We say that a rotation ρ is
eliminated in M if ρ is in the set of rotations that have to be eliminated to
obtain M from MU .
• A partial order can be defined on R: ρ  ρ′ if ρ is eliminated in every stable
matching where ρ′ is eliminated. A set X of rotations can be eliminated from
MU in some order if and only if it is a closed set in this partial order (‘closed’
means that if ρ1 ∈ X and ρ2  ρ1, then ρ2 ∈ X).
It follows from the above facts that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the closed sets in the partial order of rotations (including the empty set and the set R)
and the stable matchings of the preference system. Let RM denote the set of rotations
corresponding to the stable matching M .
Given a cost function c : E → Z on the edges of the graph, we can define a cost
function c′ : R→ Z on the rotations the following way: For a rotation ρ := (v1, u1, . . . ,
vk, uk) let
c′(ρ) := −c(v1u1) + c(u1v2)− c(v2u2) + c(u2v3)− · · ·+ c(ukv1). (1)
Then for every stable matching M , c(M) = c(MU) + c
′(RM). This means that a
minimum cost stable matching corresponds to a minimum cost closed set of rotations.
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In the following we define a directed graph D = (R,A) on the set of rotations, with
the property that its transitive closure is the partial order ≺, i.e. there is a directed
path in D from ρ to ρ′ if and only if ρ  ρ′. The digraph D has two types of edges.
Type 1: (ρ, ρ′) ∈ A if there is an edge (u, v) ∈ E (u ∈ U, v ∈ V ) contained in both
rotations such that in ρ the other edge at u is better than (u, v), and n ρ′ the other
edge at u is worse than (u, v).
V
U u
v
ρρ′
Figure 2: Edge of type 1 in D
Type 2: (ρ, ρ′) ∈ A if there is an edge (u, v) ∈ E (u ∈ U, v ∈ V ) which is between
the two edges of ρ′ incident to u according to <u, and is between the two edges of ρ
incident to v according to <v.
v u ρ′ρ
Figure 3: Edge of type 2 in D
It is easy to see that if (ρ, ρ′) ∈ A, then ρ ≺ ρ′.
Theorem 2.2 ([5]). The transitive closure of the digraph D is the partial order .
Corollary 2.3 ([5]). There is a one-to-one correspondence between the stable match-
ings of the preference system (G,O) and the sets of in-degree 0 of D.
The sets of in-degree 0 of D can be described as the integer points of the following
polyhedron:
06 x6 1,
x(ρ)− x(ρ′)> 0, if (ρ, ρ′) ∈ A. (2)
The matrix of this system is totally unimodular since it is a network matrix. Given
a cost function c, finding a minimum cost stable matching corresponds to the problem
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of finding an integer solution x of the above system for which c′x is minimal, where c′ is
the cost function defined in (1). The minimum value of c′x is equal to c(Mopt)−c(MU),
where Mopt is a minimum weight stable matching.
If we consider the dual problem, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2.4. Let c′ be the cost function defined in (1). There exists an integer
vector z ∈ ZR∪A such that
zρ > 0 if ρ ∈ R,
z(ρ,ρ′) > 0, if (ρ, ρ′) ∈ A,
−zρ + z(∆+(ρ))− z(∆−(ρ))6 c′(ρ), if ρ ∈ R,
(3)
and
−
∑
ρ∈R
zρ = c(Mopt)− c(MU),
where Mopt is a minimum weight stable matching, and ∆
+(ρ) (resp. ∆−(ρ)) denotes
the set of edges of D leaving (resp. entering) ρ.
3 Polyhedral results
3.1 Variables on stable matching edges
Given a bipartite preference system (G = (U, V ;E),O), let Est denote the set of edges
in E that belong to some stable matching. We first show a TDI system with variables
x ∈ REst that describes the convex hull of stable matchings.
Theorem 3.1. The following system with variables x ∈ REst is TDI:
min cx s.t.
x> 0,
x(ϕst(e))> 1, if e ∈ E \ Est,
x(ϕst(e)) = 1, if e ∈ Est,
(4)
where ϕst(e) is the set of edges in Est that dominate e. Furthermore, the system
describes the convex hull of stable matchings.
Proof. It is easy to see that all stable matchings satisfy the inequalities, so they belong
to the polyhedron. Let x be an integer element of the polyhedron, and e = (u, v) ∈ Est
such that e is the worst edge at u in Est. We know from the lattice property of stable
matchings that e is the best edge at v, so ϕst(e) = Dst(u), where Dst(u) is the set of
edges in Est incident to u. It follows that x(Dst(u)) = 1 if u is covered by a stable
matching, so x is a matching that covers the nodes covered by every stable matching.
The other inequalities imply that x is actually a stable matching.
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By the above argument, the TDI property implies that the system describes the
convex hull of stable matchings. To prove the TDI property, it is enough to show that
for every integer cost function c ∈ ZEst there exists an integer dual vector y ∈ ZE
that satisfies the following:
y(e)> 0, if e ∈ E \ Est, (5)
y(ψ(e))6 c(e), if e ∈ Est, (6)∑
e∈E
y(e) =c(Mopt), (7)
where ψ(e) is the set of edges dominated by e, and Mopt is a minimum cost stable
matching.
We will construct a feasible y using the vector z ∈ ZR∪A which exists according to
Corollary 2.4 (here R is the set of rotations and D = (R,A) is the acyclic digraph
referred to in Theorem 2.2). Let ρ1, . . . , ρr be a topological order of D, i.e. an order
of the rotations in which they can be eliminated. We will denote zρi by zi and z(ρi,ρj)
by zij.
The construction of y consists of constructing a sequence of vectors y0, y1, . . . , yr,
such that yt satisfies the inequalities of type (6) on the edges of MU and on the edges
that appear in rotations ρ1, . . . , ρt, and
∑
e∈E yt(e) = c(MU) −
∑t
i=1 zi. This would
imply that y := yr satisfies all inequalities of type (6) and
∑
e∈E y(e) = c(Mopt),
since
∑r
i=1 zi = c(MU) − c(Mopt). Thus the constructed y would have the required
properties.
In order to make this step-by-step construction possible, some additional technical
conditions are required for the vectors y0, . . . , yr. For i = 1, . . . , r, let us choose an
arbitrary promoted edge ei0 of the rotation ρi. If (ρi, ρj) ∈ A and it is an edge of type
2, then we choose an edge eij = uv that is between the two edges of ρi incident to
v according to <v, and is between the two edges of ρj incident to u according to <u
(such an edge exists because (ρi, ρj) is an edge of type 2).
For 06 t6 r and e ∈ Est, let
ct(e) = c(e)−
∑
{zli | l 6 t < i, e 6V el0, (ρl, ρi) ∈ A}.
Note that cr = c. We will define vectors y0, y1, . . . , yr in ZE such that the following
conditions hold for every 06 t6 r:
(C1) yt(e)> 0 if e ∈ E \ Est,
(C2) yt(ψ(e))6 ct(e) if e ∈MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt,
(C3)
∑
e∈E
yt(e) = c(MU)−
t∑
i=1
zi,
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(C4) supp yt ⊆MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt ∪ {eij : (i, j 6 t)}.
The condition (C2) means that at some edges the inequality (6) should hold with
a surplus that depends on t and the digraph D. This surplus can be used in the
construction of subsequent yi vectors. As we have already mentioned, the vector
y := yr is in the dual polyhedron, and
∑
e∈E ye = c(Mopt), so it is an optimal dual
solution.
Let
y0(e) :=
{
c(e) if e ∈MU ,
0 otherwise
Then (C2) holds for every edge of MU , and
∑
e∈E y0(e) = c(MU), as required. The
other conditions are also satisfied.
The vector yt is obtained from yt−1 by changing it only on the edges of ρ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt
and on the edges elt (for l 6 t). Let wt1, wt2, . . . wt2k be the nodes of the rotation ρt in
reverse order, such that (wt2k, w
t
1) = e
t
0. Thus w
t
i is in U if i is odd and it is in V if i
is even.
Let eti denote the edge (w
t
i , w
t
i+1). Then e
t
i <wti e
t
i−1. Every edge e
t
2i+1 is a discarded
edge in ρt, hence yt−1(ψ(et2i+1))6 ct−1(et2i+1).
et0
wt2 ∈ V
et2k−1 ρt
wt1 ∈ U et1
wt2k
et2
Figure 4: The rotation ρt (the thick edges are the discarded edges)
We will use the fact that if en edge e is incident to wt2i+1 and yt−1(e) 6= 0, then
e 6wt2i+1 e
t
2i+1 <wt2i+1 e
t
2i. Analogously, if e is incident to w
t
2i and yt−1(e) 6= 0, then
e> wt2ie
t
2i−1 >wt2i e
t
2i.
Before constructing yt, we will define a vector y
′
t that satisfies conditions (C1), (C3)
and (C4) for t, and y′t(ψ(e))6 ct−1(e) for every e ∈MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt except for
et0. The vector y
′
t is obtained from yt−1 by changing the values only on the edges of
ρt. For j = 0, 1, . . . k − 1 let
y′t(e
t
2j+1) := yt−1(e
t
2j+1) +
2j∑
i=1
(−1)i+1c(eti),
y′t(e
t
2j) :=
2j∑
i=1
(−1)ic(eti),
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and let
y′t(e
t
0) := −zt.
It is easy to check that if e ∈MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt−1, then y′t(ψ(e))6 yt−1(ψ(e)),
so (C2) holds with respect to t− 1.
We also have to check that (C2) for t−1 holds on the promoted edges of ρt. Observe
that c(et2j) − c(et2j−1) = ct−1(et2j) − ct−1(et2j−1) and yt−1(ψ(et2j)) = yt−1(ψ(et2j−1)) for
every j. Using these facts,
y′t(ψ(e
t
2j) = y
′
t(e
t
2j) + yt−1(ψ(e
t
2j−1)) + y
′
t(e
t
2j−1)− yt−1(et2j−1) =
=
2j∑
i=1
(−1)ic(eti) + yt−1(ψ(et2j−1)) +
2j−2∑
i=1
(−1)i+1c(eti) =
= yt−1(ψ(et2j−1))− ct−1(et2j−1) + ct−1(et2j)6
6 ct−1(et2j),
so y′t(ψ(e))6 ct−1(e) for every e ∈MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ ρ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt except for et0.
Condition (C3) holds because
∑
e∈E
y′t(e) =
∑
e∈E
yt−1(e)− zt = c(MU)−
t∑
i=1
zi.
To obtain yt from y
′
t, we make the following changes for every l for which (ρl, ρt) ∈ A.
Suppose that (ρl, ρt) ∈ A is an edge of type 1. Then there is a common edge in
the two rotations that has even index in ρl and odd index in ρt, say e
l
2i = e
t
2j+1. For
every 06 p6 i − 1 we increase y′t by zlt on the edges el2p, and decrease by zlt on the
edges el2p+1. For every j +16 q 6 k− 1 we increase y′t by zlt on the edges et2q, and we
decrease by zlt on the edges e
t
2q+1.
+++ −
−
−
+zlt
−zlt
et0
el0
ρt ρl
el2i = e
t
2j+1
Figure 5: If (ρl, ρt) is an edge of type 1
If there is an edge of type 2 from ρl to ρt, then the edge elt has an endnode of even
index in ρl, say w
l
2i, and it has an endnode of odd index in ρt, say w
l
2j+1.
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For every 06 p6 i − 1 we increase y′t by zlt on the edges el2p, and decrease by
zlt on the edges e
l
2p+1. We increase y
′
t by zlt on elt and on the edges e
t
2q for every
j + 16 q 6 k − 1. For every j 6 q 6 k − 1 we decrease by zlt on the edges et2q+1.
ρt
++
−
−
−
elt
+
−
+ −
+ρl el0
et0
Figure 6: If (ρl, ρt) is an edge of type 2
After such a modification, condition (C1) holds because y′t is increased on elt by a
non-negative value.
The number of edges where we increased by zlt is the same as the number of edges
where we decreased, thus
∑
e∈E
yt(e) =
∑
e∈E
y′t(e) = c(MU)−
t∑
i=1
zi.
For a fixed l, if e ∈MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt \ {et0} and e 6 V el0 then the number of edges
in ψ(e) that were increased by zlt is the same as the number of edges in ψ(e) that
were decreased. If e ∈ MU ∪ ρ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ρt \ {et0} and e 6V el0 then y′t(ψ(e)) increases
by zlt, which is exactly the allowed amount, since the term zlt appears in ct−1(e) but
not in ct(e).
Since {e ∈ ρt : e 6V et0} = {et0}, the only condition we have yet to verify is
that yt(ψ(e
t
0))6 ct(et0). Let us introduce the notation α :=
∑{zlt | l < t, et0 6V
el0, (ρl, ρt) ∈ A}. Then ct(et0) = ct−1(et0)− z(∆+(ρt)) + α, so the following holds:
yt(ψ(e
t
0)) = y
′
t(ψ(e
t
0))− z(∆−(ρt)) + α =
= y′t(e
t
0) + yt−1(ψ(e
t
2k−1)) + y
′
t(e
t
2k−1)− yt−1(et2k−1)− z(∆−(ρt)) + α =
= −zt + yt−1(ψ(et2k−1)) +
2k−2∑
i=1
(−1)i+1c(eti)− z(∆−(ρt)) + α6
6 c′(ρt)− z(∆+(ρt)) + ct−1(et2k−1)− c′(ρt)− c(et2k−1) + c(et0) + α6
6 c′(ρt)− z(∆+(ρt)) + ct−1(et2k−1)− c′(ρt)− ct−1(et2k−1) + ct−1(et0) + α =
= ct−1(et0)− z(∆+(ρt)) + α = ct(et0),
where we used the fact that −zt − z(∆−(ρt))6 c′(ρt) − z(∆+(ρt)) by (3). Thus yt
satisfies condition (C2) on all the required edges.
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3.2 Variables on all edges
In [7], Rothblum gave a linear system that describes the convex hull of stable match-
ings of an arbitrary bipartite preference system. We now prove, using Theorem 3.1,
that this system is also TDI.
Theorem 3.2. The following system, with variables x ∈ RE, is totally dual integral:
x> 0, (8)
−x(D(w))> − 1, if w ∈ U ∪ V, (9)
x(ϕ(e))> 1, if e ∈ E. (10)
Proof. Let c ∈ ZE be an integer cost function. We have to find an integer optimal
dual solution for c, i.e. vectors pi ∈ ZU∪V and y ∈ ZE that satisfy
y(e)> 0, (11)
pi(w)> 0, (12)
−pi(u)− pi(v) + y(ψ(e))6 c(e), if e = (u, v) ∈ E, (13)
and
−
∑
w∈U∪V
pi(w) +
∑
e∈E
y(e) = c(Mopt).
Let y0 ∈ ZE be an integral dual optimal solution of the system (4) for the cost
function c restricted to Est, which exists by Theorem 3.1, and let pi0 be the all-zero
vector on U ∪ V . Then (y0, pi0) satisfies (11) if e ∈ E \Est, it satisfies (13) if e ∈ Est,
and −∑w∈U∪V pi0(w) +∑e∈E y0(e) = c(Mopt).
If we increase y by 1 on the edges of a stable matching M and increase pi by 1
on every node in U covered by M , then we get a dual vector for which the objective
value is the same, and the left side of (13) does not increase for any edge, since
|ψ(e) ∩M |6 1, and if |ψ(e) ∩M | = 1 then both endnodes of e are covered by M ,
otherwise e would blockM . Moreover, if e is dominated by 2 edges ofM then the left
side of (13) decreases for e. Let E ′ be the set of edges that are dominated by 2 edges
of some stable matching. By applying modifications of the above type, a dual vector
(y1, pi1) can be constructed which satisfies (11) for every edge, and satisfies (13) for
edges in Est ∪ E ′.
Let e = (u, v) /∈ Est ∪ E ′. There is no matching M such that (u, pM(u)) <u
e <u (u, sM(u)), since then two edges of M would dominate e. It follows that either
e >u (u, pMV (u)) or e >v (pMU (v), v). Suppose that the first case holds (the second one
can be treated similarly by exchanging U and V ). Let (v = v1, u1, v2, u2, . . . vk, uk) be
a maximal sequence such that (ui, vi) ∈MV for every i = 1, . . . , k and vi+1 = sMV (ui)
for every i = 1, . . . , k−1. Since no rotation can be eliminated from MV , sM(uk) must
be undefined. This is possible in the following two cases.
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Case 1: there is no edge (uk, v
′) that is better at v′ than (pMV (v
′), v′). In this case
we increase y by 1 on edges in MV \ {(u1, v1), . . . , (uk, vk)}∪ {(u1, v2), . . . , (uk−1, vk)},
and increase pi by 1 on every node in U − uk covered by MV .
Case 2: there is an edge (uk, vk+1) ∈ E such that vk+1 is not covered by MV and
(uk, vk+1) <uk (uk, v
′) if (uk, v′) is better at v′ than (pMV (v
′), v′). In this case we
increase y by 1 on the edges in MV \{(u1, v1), . . . , (uk, vk)}∪{(u1, v2), . . . , (uk, vk+1)},
and increase pi by 1 on every node in U covered by MV .
It is easy to see that in both cases the objective value remains the same, the left
side of (13) does not increase for any edge, and it decreases by 1 for e. So by applying
such modifications on every edge where (13) does not hold we can obtain an integer
optimal dual solution.
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